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One of the competing narratives about Roe v. Wade1 is that the Supreme 
Court invented the constitutional right to abortion out of whole cloth. 
Nothing in the Constitution or American history or law, so the narrative goes, 
supports this right. Rather, seven unelected lawyers who are unaccountable 
to the American public inscribed it into the United States Reporter simply 
because they thought it was the right thing to do.2 
Not so, says Professor Anita Bernstein in her intriguing new book, The 
Common Law Inside the Female Body. As Bernstein argues, the common 
law, a source of law usually associated with the interests of conservative, 
propertied, old white men, is actually a powerful source of liberty for 
women. In particular, the common law’s central command—that people are 
free to say “Do Not Want” with respect to their bodies, property, and 
money—applies to women. Bernstein’s application of this central command 
in two different legal contexts arising “inside the female body” means that 
the common law protects a right for women to say no to penetration and 
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 1 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 937–40 (1973) (describing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as a case that “had simply 
manufactured a constitutional right out of whole cloth” and then arguing that Roe and Lochner are 
“twins”). 
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unwanted pregnancy. It is this latter right that directly challenges the notion 
that the Supreme Court invented the right to abortion in Roe. 
In this short review of Bernstein’s book, I will first lay out her basic 
argument about the common law’s protection for the right to abortion. From 
there, I will discuss both the promise and the peril of rooting the abortion 
right in the common law. 
I. THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO ABORTION 
According to Bernstein, the common law’s basic command is that 
everyone has a right to say no to what they Do Not Want (her capitalization).3 
Tracing the origin of this right through the common law of tort, property, 
contract, and criminal law, Bernstein calls this concept “condoned self-
regard.”4 In other words, the law recognizes that people have the right to act 
in their own self-interest, without concern for others, when denying others 
use of their own body, property, and money. Using easily accessible 
examples, she develops the basis for this right across many different 
contexts.5 
Throughout her book, Bernstein calls this condoned self-regard a form 
of negative liberty. Violations of this concept of negative liberty are 
“‘boundary-crossings’ . . . a sense of having been hurt, threatened, entered, 
used, confined, exposed, stolen from, or put to wrongful orders through the 
overt action of another person or persons.”6 Other than the exceptions she 
explains in detail (and I discuss below), the ability to seek recourse in law 
for these boundary-crossings is absolute. Despite the common law’s history 
of limiting or ignoring women’s rights in various ways, in a post-coverture 
world where women’s equality is an almost universally recognized principle 
of law, Bernstein concludes that women receive all the benefits of the 
common law as men. 
Bernstein then looks at how this principle of recognizing the right to 
say Do Not Want applies inside the female body, specifically regarding 
unwanted penetration and unwanted pregnancies, the latter being the focus 
of this review. Bernstein argues that state prohibitions on abortion are direct 
violations of the common law right to say Do Not Want.7 Pregnancy, which 
is risky and has lifelong consequences, is something many people decide 
they Do Not Want because they Do Not Want, what Bernstein calls, an 
unwelcome “occupant” in their body. This occupant causes the pregnant 
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person unwanted physical pain and trauma and invades her private spaces. 
Moreover, the occupant “receives beneficence” from the pregnant body, 
something the woman does not have to give to the occupant unless she wants 
to.8 Grounding these arguments in common law principles of self-defense, 
defense of property, and unjust enrichment, Bernstein argues that even if you 
consider this occupant a living human being with the same moral and legal 
rights as any other living human being, the pregnant person has a right to use 
deadly force to protect herself and her property. Stated more plainly, the 
common law gives the pregnant woman a right to kill the living being inside 
her when she does not want it there. 
In the most powerful section of this chapter on unwanted pregnancy, 
Bernstein explains how far this common law right goes by deeply probing 
the common law right of self-defense. She says that this right against such a 
“ruthless invader” applies even more powerfully when the invasion is “from 
the inside.”9 Moreover, because the common law right of self-defense applies 
regardless of whether the intruder is blameworthy or has a strong reason to 
invade someone’s property or body, the common law abortion right applies 
regardless of whether the pregnancy threatens the pregnant woman.10 The 
common law right also protects the medical professionals who perform the 
abortion because the common law allows deadly force in the defense of 
others. Finally, because the common law considers self-defense a 
“justif[cation]” rather than an “excuse[],” the common law right of abortion 
gives the stamp of approval to abortion instead of saying that it is a wrongful 
action that is somehow excused in this instance.11 Together, these common 
law principles add up to a strong abortion right rooted in the liberty to say no 
and unbounded by any rights of the fetus. 
II. THE PROMISE OF A COMMON LAW RIGHT TO ABORTION 
Bernstein’s common law right to abortion has much promise. First, 
grounding abortion in the common law could help if the Supreme Court were 
to ever revisit Roe v. Wade now that Justice Kavanaugh has replaced Justice 
Kennedy. The Court showed no interest in doing so during Kavanaugh’s first 
term, but that could change at any moment. If that happens, the common 
law’s support for negative liberty generally and the specific right to abortion 
could help persuade the Court’s conservative Justices that the right to 
abortion is properly grounded in the Constitution. Regardless of whether 
they solely use originalist methodology or rely on history and original 
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understanding as one of many ways to approach the issue, Justices who 
might otherwise be hostile to the notion of a constitutional right to abortion 
could be nudged in the direction of reaffirming Roe because of Bernstein’s 
argument about its solid historical footing. 
This is not a guarantee, of course. Bernstein recognizes throughout her 
book that the common law did not fully cover women until long after the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, which calls into question whether the 
original understanding at the time of its ratification would include women’s 
rights to negative liberty.12 Moreover, nowhere does Bernstein claim that 
common law judges specifically recognized a right to terminate a pregnancy, 
as opposed to a more general idea of negative liberty that, Bernstein argues, 
should include the right to abortion. However, if one or more of the 
conservative Justices adopt a more generalized approach to originalism, they 
could find Bernstein’s argument helpful. 
Second, key to Bernstein’s argument is that the “condoned self-regard” 
of the common law means that people can exercise their negative liberty 
rights for any reason, whether it be good or bad, rational or absurd. As 
Bernstein explains, when people exercise their rights to say Do Not Want, 
“[t]hey do not need a good reason, or any reason at all, to support their 
rejection decisions. Their not wanting suffices.”13 Applied to the right to 
abortion, this means that “questionable origins [can] lie behind the choice to 
end one’s pregnancy, and that result is fine with the common law.”14 
This argument about ignoring the reasons behind abortion decisions 
would be very useful to combat some of the recent developments in abortion 
restrictions. Even though studies consistently show that most women make 
abortion decisions for reasons related to family and financial responsibility,15 
laws that attempt to restrict women’s reasons for having an abortion are 
proliferating. Currently, nine states ban abortions based on the sex of the 
pregnancy, two states bans abortions based on race, and two states ban 
abortion based on genetic anomaly (with three states having a genetic 
anomaly law temporarily enjoined while being actively litigated).16 The 
debate over these types of reason-bans has intensified in recent years, with 
Justice Thomas addressing the issue in a lengthy 2019 concurrence in a 
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 16 GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION BANS IN CASES OF SEX OR RACE SELECTION OR GENETIC 
ANOMALY (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-sex-or-
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denial of certiorari in a case striking down Indiana’s reason-ban.17 In that 
concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that women who choose an abortion 
based on these reasons are part of the long history of eugenics because they 
are selecting their offspring based on perceived desired characteristics.18 
Bernstein’s common law right to abortion answers Justice Thomas and 
others who urge there to be limits on the reasons women choose abortion. To 
these people, Bernstein’s common law right says, “none of your business.” 
In other words, under Bernstein’s common law right, the law should not care 
whether women choose to have an abortion because they want to choose the 
sex of their future children or because they want to avoid bringing a child 
into the world who has a genetic anomaly. In this powerful way, the common 
law right that Bernstein advocates for agrees with the abortion-rights rallying 
cry, “Trust Women.”19 
Third and finally, Bernstein’s common law right to abortion provides a 
powerful answer to the growing trend to prohibit abortion at various stages 
of pregnancy. In 2019, states like Ohio and Georgia passed laws prohibiting 
abortions at six weeks. Less extreme but still burdensome, various states 
have prohibitions at twelve, fifteen, eighteen, twenty, twenty-two, and 
twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.20 So far, all bans earlier than twenty weeks 
have been enjoined by courts, including all of the laws enacted in 2019, but 
extant bans in the weeks after that are common.21 
The common law right identified by Bernstein would find that all of 
these bans violate the woman’s right to terminate. Bernstein’s analysis does 
not depend, as many abortion rights arguments do, on the fetus being 
anything less than a full human being with personhood rights.22 Under her 
analysis, even if the fetus is a fully legal person, the pregnant woman has a 
right to say Do Not Want, just as a land owner can use deadly force to remove 
another person from her property. Bernstein recognizes that this is where the 
“common law diverges most sharply from Roe,”23 since Roe and its progeny 
 
 17 Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. and Ky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
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 19 Ed Pilkington, Ten Years After Abortion Doctor’s Murder, One Woman Carries the Fight for 
Reproductive Rights, GUARDIAN (May 31, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/may/30/he-gave-so-much-the-woman-fighting-the-abortion-wars-begun-by-george-tiller 
[https://perma.cc/XYK5-AK37]. 
 20 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE ABORTION BANS BY GESTATIONAL AGE (June 15, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/images/381.state_trends_june_update.png 
[https://perma.cc/WQ4C-ZWSB]. 
 21 Id. 
 22 BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 173 (“[E]ven if termination of a pregnancy kills a person, which may 
or may not be the case, the common law supports this action at the election of the one who is pregnant.”). 
 23 Id. at 170. 
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tolerate abortion bans at viability (roughly twenty-four weeks of pregnancy) 
because of the value of protecting the state’s interest in potential life.24 The 
common law, on the other hand, permits abortion “at any stage of 
pregnancy.”25 For women who face the prospects of choosing an abortion 
after twenty weeks, Bernstein’s position would prohibit states from stopping 
them from exercising their liberty to say no. Although, as Bernstein 
recognizes, this position would depart dramatically from the doctrine of Roe, 
there are several states in the country that do in fact allow people to terminate 
their pregnancies after viability, implicitly recognizing the value of letting 
women decide—at any stage of pregnancy—what they Do Not Want in their 
bodies.26 
III. THE PERILS OF A COMMON LAW RIGHT TO ABORTION 
As much promise as the common law right to abortion holds, there is 
also huge peril. First, in the hands of most anti-abortion activists, Bernstein’s 
explanation of the common law exceptions to negative liberty would be 
dangerous to the interests she and I hold dear. As Bernstein explains, the 
right to negative liberty, including the right to terminate a pregnancy, does 
not apply when a person has consented to the incursion or voluntarily 
undertaken the activity that is part of it.27 It would be easy to imagine 
someone opposed to abortion saying that a pregnant woman consented to 
becoming pregnant when she had consensual sex, because pregnancy is a 
known possible outcome to having sex.28 Or, that same abortion opponent 
could argue that when someone engages in consensual sex, they begin an 
undertaking that does not end when sex ends, but rather ends when all of the 
known effects of sex end, which could include pregnancy. This abortion 
opponent would then be able to argue that, because of the common law 
exceptions of consent and undertaking, abortion could be banned as long as 
there are exceptions for rape and incest. 
Bernstein takes up this issue in her book, but she does not adequately 
address it, particularly the consent issue. In discussing this exception, she 
 
 24 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (explaining that 
“viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to 
justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions”). 
 25 BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 171. 




 27 BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 58–65. 
 28 See generally Alec Walen, Consensual Sex Without Assuming the Risk of Carrying an Unwanted 
Fetus; Another Foundation for the Right to an Abortion, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1051 (1997). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
146 
writes that “[i]f pregnancy of itself necessarily proves that the pregnant 
individual consented to anything, then a common law rationale to compel 
gestation and childbirth could take form. But pregnancy provides no such 
proof.”29 That pregnancy does not prove consent is unquestionably true, but 
that is exactly the reason that rape and incest exceptions are included in most 
anti-abortion laws.30 With an exception allowing a pregnant woman to say 
she was raped or the victim of incest, especially if liberally applied, a ban on 
abortion would, from the perspective of someone who believes that consent 
to sex includes consent to everything that might come with sex, still satisfy 
Bernstein’s common law principles. 
Second, a common law justification for abortion is vulnerable to the 
same override every common law right is: legislation. Bernstein 
acknowledges as such in her book, recognizing what she calls “legislative 
supremacy” as the “least controversial weakness of the common law as a 
source of rights for individuals.”31 In other words, even if there is a common 
law right to abortion, legislatures can change the common law through 
simple legislation, and these new laws would trump. 
Because this is a basic principle of U.S. law, Bernstein does not dispute 
how statutory law interacts with the common law, but she does try to blunt 
it. She explains that courts often interpret ambiguous statutes to do the least 
amount of damage to the common law as possible, which makes common 
law rights still relevant.32 Using abortion as an example, she says that courts 
faced with a forced ultrasound law, because of the common law right to 
abortion, should read such a statute to allow abdominal ultrasounds rather 
than requiring transvaginal ultrasounds.33 
This example does indeed work to prove her point, but it is entirely too 
limited to quell the fear that legislatures will override abortion rights. Anti-
abortion legislatures, like those that we saw were very active in the first half 
of 2019,34 will not be deterred by a common law right and will, if the statutory 
construction principle Bernstein discusses becomes an issue, craft their laws 
with more specificity. Doing so would render the common law’s support for 
the abortion right irrelevant, and anti-abortion legislation could move 
forward with no concern. 
 
 29 BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 148. 
 30 Loren G. Stern, Abortion: Reform and the Law, 59 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 84, 94 (1968). 
 31 BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 177. 
 32 Id. at 177–80. 
 33 Id. at 179–80. 
 34 Elizabeth Nash, A Surge in Bans on Abortion as Early as Six Weeks, Before Most People Know 
They Are Pregnant, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 30, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/03/surge-bans-abortion-early-six-weeks-most-people-know-
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Third, the negative liberty right to abortion suffers from all the 
limitations of any negative right. In particular, as many scholars have argued, 
the constitutional right to abortion, which is likewise often rooted in notions 
of negative liberty, does not guarantee actual access to abortion services. As 
a result, women of color, poor women, and women who live outside major 
metropolitan areas, among others, may have the theoretical right to abortion 
but in reality, have a harder time actually accessing one.35 Without an 
affirmative right to abortion, the law’s response is that their troubles are of 
their own making, and all the law has to do is make sure that if they were 
able to get to an abortion clinic and have the money to pay for it, their actions 
would not be criminal.36 
Bernstein acknowledges the limits of negative liberty throughout her 
book. She writes that “[t]o hold negative liberty is not to have anywhere near 
everything a person needs. Material supports that help a person to flourish, 
which sometimes get grouped under a rubric of affirmative liberty, are 
essential.”37 This acknowledgment parallels the most trenchant critique of 
negative liberty in the context of abortion, which comes from the 
reproductive justice movement. Reproductive justice, a framework 
developed by women of color that centers their lived experiences, argues that 
there should be a positive right of reproductive autonomy grounded in basic 
human rights notions. With that framework, reproductive justice focuses on 
three rights: the right to not have a child (where abortion falls), the right to 
have a child, and the right to parent your children in a healthy and safe 
environment.38 
Bernstein’s common law right to terminate a pregnancy grounded in the 
Do Not Want principle barely scratches the surface of the practical needs that 
the reproductive justice framework identifies. Loretta J. Ross and Rickie 
Solinger explain that reproductive justice necessitates both negative and 
positive rights. Among those positive rights includes “access to specific, 
community-based resources including high-quality health care, housing and 
education, a living wage, a healthy environment, and a safety net for times 
when these resources fail.”39 Without these resources, abortion access (as 
well as childbirth and parenting justice) is impossible for many. Yet, the 
common law negative right leaves people wanting to terminate their 
 
 35 Imani Gandy, New Abortion Ban Lawsuit Places Black Georgians Squarely at the Center of the 
Fight, REWIRE.NEWS (July 3, 2019), https://rewire.news/ablc/2019/07/03/new-abortion-ban-lawsuit-
places-black-georgians-squarely-at-the-center-of-the-fight [https://perma.cc/W78X-89AJ]. 
 36 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 310 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977). 
 37 BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 176. 
 38 LORETTA J. ROSS & RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 9 (2017). 
 39 Id. 
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pregnancies stranded in this regard because it says nothing about actually 
accessing abortion care. 
CONCLUSION 
To those of us who associate the common law with the policy 
preferences of propertied, conservative, old white men, Bernstein’s account 
of the common law inside the female body is a novel and welcome 
interpretation of our negative liberty tradition. Given the current attacks on 
abortion rights from state legislatures and the federal judiciary, Bernstein’s 
common law right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy could, if widely 
adopted, help protect abortion rights in the future. However, in the wrong 
hands, her grounding could play into the goals of the anti-abortion movement 
without helping protect actual access for people seeking abortions. Thus, her 
account of this right is a double-edged sword, with much promise, but also 
much peril. 
